Sa'ar's entry into the government is now painted as a purely political maneuver, but in reality, it is also a strategic move designed to shake things up among the complacent generals in the IDF's General Staff. A few years ago, when Aviv Kochavi was still an unknown brigadier general serving as a division commander in the northern sector, a person who served under him told me, "Kochavi is a special person; it would be our luck if he ever becomes Chief of Staff."
Since that day, many fish have swum in the sea, and even more water has flowed under the bridge, with Kochavi becoming the Chief of Staff with the most disastrous career in Israeli history. The same person who once praised Kochavi’s potential later explained that Kochavi's tenure was a "failure, a historic blunder; I thought he was different."
Kochavi is not the sole culprit in the destruction of this period; the responsibility lies not only with him but with all senior IDF officials, particularly the Chief of Staffs over the last decade and a half. In hindsight, it is easy to see the pattern or, as they say in English, "hindsight is 20/20."
The organizational culture in the IDF has been in complete disarray for over a decade. It’s not just about issues like those previously addressed by Major General (ret.) Avrahami Brik concerning the "culture of deception" prevalent in the IDF and the collapse of credibility in internal military investigations. The IDF has not been functioning as a military for years, and while this problem did not begin with Kochavi, it certainly exploded under his watch. It’s not only the senior intelligence officers dealing with global warming instead of monitoring Hamas or the former Chief of Staff Eisenkot holding meetings on "gender equality" with Meretz representatives during the Knife Intifada or the endless involvement in political reports on Galei Tzahal, or the legal counsel attached to every flight and commander.
Senior IDF officials seem to have forgotten that their uniforms are not like those of El Al, Egged, or McDonald's. These uniforms signify hierarchy, obedience, combat, and sacrifice. The senior officers of the IDF do not see the IDF as a military; they see it as a career.
That is why, despite countless strategic reasons and provocations from all directions, senior IDF officials have buried their heads in the sand over the years. Just as an El Al technician might try to push a major and irritating repair onto the next shift, senior IDF officials have played "kick the can down the road" until they could leave for civilian life, with the can eventually exploding at Kochavi’s turn to deal with it.
Beyond all this, senior IDF officials have forgotten the most important truth in any army: no matter how senior they are, they are still part of the chain of command. When you receive an order from the government, your role is to execute it, not to procrastinate, drag your feet, or play games.
We saw this vividly during the protests over the judicial reform, where the IDF not only became "involuntarily" a political weapon but senior officials encouraged the move carried out by their predecessors while simultaneously silencing dissent. While the Prime Minister shouted in discussions about the need to address political refusal with an iron fist, Chief of Staff Kochavi went to "dialogue meetings" with the refusers, and the Air Force commander went to "embrace them" and praised how the refusers contributed to Israel’s security.
We even saw this during the war when the government and the cabinet pushed for the continued grinding of Hamas, aiming for a decisive resolution to the threat from Gaza, while the senior officers appeared as stubborn mules pulling in the opposite direction. The statements of the Chief of Staff about "the need to end the war and a prisoner exchange" combined with the emotional manipulation of the IDF spokesperson reveal how deep this problem runs.
A prime example occurred not long ago, during Bennett’s government, when the then-Chief of Staff, Aviv Kochavi, who had been silent since the beginning of the war, refused Bennett’s order to eliminate Sinwar following the axe attack in Elad. Chief of Staff Kochavi, who is legally subordinate to the government, demanded that Bennett "convince him of the necessity of the move," otherwise he would not carry it out. As we know today, Kochavi indeed did not comply with the Prime Minister’s order.
The appointment of Sa'ar to the Defense Ministry could be exactly the jolt the system needs. Once Kochavi and other members of the General Staff Forum no longer have the "impenetrable wall" in the form of Yoav Galant in the Defense Minister's office, it will be possible to begin real reforms to correct the system.
Reforms that have not been implemented so far due to Galant’s and the General Staff Forum’s unified stance will be reopened for discussion, appointments made by the Chief of Staff during the war will be reviewed, and even Kochavi himself might finally face a minister who does not say "amen" to every one of his absurd statements, and might even be forced to resign, hopefully to be replaced by someone a bit less tired and anemic.
And let’s not forget, this move is a double-edged sword. If Netanyahu indeed prolongs the war for political or personal interests, Sa'ar will be able to expose this publicly. While Netanyahu can disown the statements of Defense Minister Galant under the (fairly justified) accusation that he always acted as an opposition within the government, Sa'ar, his long-time rival who replaces Galant, will be a much harder person to silence and disown.
