After Months of Silence, the Truth Explodes: What Really Happened at the Nova Festival

An IDF investigative report published Thursday reveals a devastating series of operational failures by the Southern Command, Gaza Division, and Northern Brigade that led to the inability to prevent the massacre at the Nova music festival on October 7 — the deadliest terror attack in Israel’s history.

According to the report, 397 civilians, soldiers, police officers, and Shin Bet agents were murdered at the Nova festival. Another 44 were abducted, 11 of whom were later killed in captivity.

Heroic Actions Amid Failures

Despite the failures, the report praises the swift decision of Ofakim police chief Superintendent Niv Ohana, who ordered the festival to be dispersed immediately upon hearing gunfire at 6:30 a.m., a move that the report concludes saved thousands of lives.

The investigation also commends the bravery of police officers, security staff, and a small number of IDF soldiers from the Givati Brigade and the Prison Service’s Metzada unit, who fought the terrorists despite arriving only hours later.

Hamas Arrived by Mistake

One of the report's key findings is that Hamas was unaware of the Nova festival’s existence. The terrorist cell was en route to the city of Netivot, mistakenly turned at Shokeda Junction, and ended up at the Re’im parking lot — the site of the festival.

Most victims were killed while fleeing the area and encountered Hamas terrorists at several key points along evacuation routes. The report outlines where victims were attacked:

The Attack Plan and Timeline

Hamas initiated the assault with a barrage of 5,000 rockets. Under cover of fire, approximately 1,200 operatives infiltrated Israeli territory, targeting IDF bases and junctions in order to isolate Gaza border communities before proceeding to commit mass atrocities in residential areas.

At 6:45 a.m., terrorists opened fire on festivalgoers at Miflasim bend. By 7:15, injured individuals began returning to the site after being ambushed on Route 232. Police blocked northern exits, preventing further casualties. Officers then cleared paths eastward through fields and instructed revelers to flee by car or on foot.

Approval and Oversight Failures

The Nova festival had received full legal permits. Organizers submitted two requests — initially for October 5–6, and later an extension for October 6–7 — both of which were approved. On September 20, the plans were reviewed by Ofakim police leadership; IDF representatives failed to attend.

On October 2, the second permit was confirmed in a police review. Again, the IDF did not participate in the meeting, though a Home Front Command officer conducted a site inspection with the festival’s head of security. The Gaza Division eventually approved the festival, despite initial resistance from the brigade commander who cited a lack of resources.

Critical Failures on the Ground

The IDF report is scathing in its assessment of the Northern Brigade under Col. Haim Cohen and the Gaza Division. It notes the failure to coordinate security with the police, the absence of military representation in the joint command post, and a lack of troop deployment to the site.

At 90% evacuation, the brigade mistakenly downgraded its alertness, losing situational awareness. A misjudgment by an Air Force helicopter pilot is also noted: despite identifying Hamas vehicles, the pilot refrained from engaging, not realizing they were enemy forces. The report states he should have fired warning shots to provoke a response.

Bravery Amid the Horror

Security guards and police officers fought to defend civilians for hours. A Shaked Battalion force, arriving later, joined remaining production staff and continued resisting Hamas attackers. Some wounded individuals even returned to the festival grounds, assuming it was a safer zone due to the presence of medics and fighters.

Twelve members of the security team were killed. Three — Bar Kuperstein, Rom Breslavsky, and Eitan Mor — remain in Hamas captivity.

Nukhba Unit Arrives by Error

The Hamas Nukhba unit from Nuseirat — around 100 operatives in 14 Toyota pickups — had aimed for Netivot, but due to a navigation error arrived at the festival. An IDF tank briefly delayed them, but the terrorists ultimately breached the site, where around 200 people were still present, including staff, police, and injured individuals.

Only at 11:30 a.m. did a soldier on leave reach out to his commander, who redirected a small Givati force under the Efraim Brigade. Joined by two Metzada operatives, they became the first unit to engage the terrorists directly, killing at least 12 in close combat.

Conclusion: A Systemic Breakdown

The report concludes that the Northern Brigade and Gaza Division had a false picture of what was unfolding at the Nova festival. There was no real-time coordination with police, and the first IDF Operations Division update came only after 10:00 a.m. — over three hours after the massacre began.

The document describes this as the result of a long chain of failures across multiple military echelons, ultimately leading to the worst terror attack in Israeli history.

Nova Organizers Respond

In a public statement, the Nova production team said: