Was the October 7 massacre preventable? The IDF's deep secrets about warnings that were ignored

The reason for this is the fact that Sami Turjeman, who had already warned in 2014 of a massacre similar to the one that occurred on October 7, was dismissed and prevented from passing on his warnings to the political echelon by the Chief of Staff and the then-Minister of Defense.

In the wake of the October 7 attacks, Israel's Chief of Staff, Major General Eyal Zamir, announced the opening of a series of investigations into the failures that led to the breach by Hamas. A new external inspection team was appointed, led by Major General (Res.) Sami Turjeman, the former commander of the IDF Southern Command.

The reason for the investigation stems from a stark contradiction in the IDF’s current position regarding the raid scenario. The IDF's official stance had been that they were unprepared for an attack of the scale that Hamas carried out. According to the IDF, the army had been prepared for a scenario involving four breaches in the border fence and up to 70 terrorists infiltrating the country. However, the actual situation on October 7 was far more catastrophic, with over 170 breaches and around 5,600 Hamas terrorists entering Israel.

What adds to the complexity is that Turjeman, in 2014, had already warned of a deadly attack of this nature. At the time, he briefed military reporters about a Hamas plan to conduct fatal bombings, including raids on Israeli settlements, mass murder of women and children, and abductions. According to Turjeman, Hamas had shifted its strategy from defense to aggressive offense, with the aim of raiding villages, killing civilians, and returning to Gaza. He explained that Hamas had developed forces capable of executing such an attack, and its tunnel infrastructure was central to this change.

What is most troubling is that Turjeman wanted to present this intelligence to the political echelon. However, both the Chief of Staff at the time, Benny Gantz, and then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon refused to allow him to share these warnings with political leaders. Instead, they dismissed him and sent him home.

The IDF's own investigation into the events of October 7 now acknowledges that the army did not recognize a "murderous raid plan" like the one Hamas carried out. The unsettling conclusion here is that while the IDF was aware of the possibility of such an attack, it chose to ignore the warnings. This failure is compounded by the fact that officers involved in this tragic oversight seem to be uncomfortable with Turjeman’s appointment to lead the investigation today, given that he had been the first to accurately describe what happened a decade later.

The controversy continues to swirl, with many questioning why the warnings were ignored and how this failure of military leadership could have been prevented. It seems clear that there are deeper issues regarding how intelligence was handled in the years leading up to October 7, and those involved in the failure are reluctant to face the consequences.