October 6: When the IDF often literally fell asleep

With the publication of the official investigations into IDF conduct and preparations in the days before the October 7 attack, more and more details are coming out which shed a light on why the IDF was so incredibly unprepared for the attack.

According to a report today (Sunday) by reporter Amit Segal for Channel 12, multiple reports reached lower levels in the IDF but were ignored or not followed up on despite their urgency.

For instance, the turning on if cellphone SIM cards by Hamas commanders and members, considered to be a tripwire warning for a coming attack, was reported to the Gaza Division before October 7 and on the eve of October 7, but in both cases the email reporting the matter was simply not opened.

Reports that Nukhba commanders couldn't be found were written off as "routine" and not something to set off alarm bells - when in practice, they and their soldiers were moving to assembly areas to prepare the attack on Israel.

Worse, the IDF Intelligence Chief was on leave, and while he did send information that was pertinent to the attack, he did not follow up on it and make sure the information truly made it down the chain of command.

The Air Force also received information - which it did not share with the rest of the army - leading to much of the army remaining in the dark.

Perhaps the most stunning piece of information was the revelation that neither IDF Intelligence nor the Shin Bet had a significant number of human informants in the Gaza Strip to provide information on Hamas.

IDF Intelligence has not had a single active source in the Gaza Strip for the last 15 years, and the Shin Bet has not had an active intelligence source in the area for a long time. One junior source was apparently unable to report anything of value when entering the mosques.