Inside the deadly 10-Hour breakdown: How Israel's Gaza division was overrun on October 7

For hours, the division, responsible for the protection of the Gaza border and southern Israel, was essentially neutralized, leaving only a fraction of its troops to fend off over 5,000 Hamas terrorists. The resulting chaos and confusion left Israel vulnerable to catastrophic consequences.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) only acknowledged, months after the invasion, that the Gaza Division had been "defeated" for nearly 10 hours on that day. The fall of the division had devastating effects on the military’s response, hindering its ability to organize an effective counterattack. The lack of situational awareness, the uncoordinated response, and the insufficient number of troops available to handle the onslaught compounded the severity of the situation.

Initial Attack and Insufficient Forces

When the attack began at dawn, Israel's Gaza Division was left severely under-resourced. A mere 767 IDF soldiers were stationed at the Gaza border, tasked with protecting the 59-kilometer-long stretch between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Their task was already monumental given the proximity of the border communities to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. However, the division's commander and top officials in the IDF failed to recognize the seriousness of the attack as it unfolded.

Hamas, on the other hand, was ready with more than 5,000 terrorists, 4,700 rockets, and various assault strategies to launch a surprise multi-pronged invasion. The combination of land, sea, and air assaults overwhelmed the small number of soldiers present. Hamas terrorists attacked simultaneously from multiple directions, breaching the security barriers and infiltrating strategic locations in Israel. The unpreparedness of the IDF left southern Israel vulnerable to widespread devastation.

The Israeli government and military leadership failed to identify the attack as a critical, full-scale operation for several hours, underestimating the scale and organization of Hamas’s forces. In the crucial early hours, Hamas advanced rapidly, catching the Israeli military off guard, as it had no clear picture of the battlefield situation.

The Gaza Division’s Collapse

At approximately 6:29 AM on October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a massive ground invasion, attacking with over 5,000 operatives. This coincided with the firing of nearly 4,700 rockets at Israeli targets, leading to a swift loss of control in southern Israel. During the invasion, Hamas managed to breach the Gaza border fence at 114 locations and neutralize nearly all of the IDF’s sentry towers using explosive drones. They also attacked several key military sites, including the Re’im military base, the Gaza Division’s headquarters, and important civilian areas.

As Hamas infiltrated the border, IDF troops, scattered across the border posts, fought bravely but were outnumbered and outgunned. The number of IDF personnel in the Gaza Division was simply not enough to hold back the assault. Despite their best efforts to thwart the breaches in the barrier, the terrorists overwhelmed the defenders. Most of the 251 Israeli civilians who were abducted that day were captured in the first few hours of the attack before the IDF could organize a coherent response.

For nearly 10 hours, the Gaza Division was effectively out of commission. The IDF, scrambling to understand the scope of the attack, failed to organize reinforcements in time. The General Staff was unaware of the severity of the situation due to the lack of real-time intelligence, and as a result, failed to react with urgency. The attacks took a heavy toll on the military leadership, as several key officers, including the division commander, were killed in the early hours. This created a leadership vacuum at a time when quick and decisive actions were most needed.

Challenges in Coordination and Failure to Understand the Situation

The failure to protect Israeli civilians was not simply a failure of the troops on the ground. It was a systemic failure within the IDF’s command and control structure. One of the primary challenges identified in the investigation was the inability of military intelligence to produce an accurate and timely picture of the unfolding crisis. The lack of communication between divisions, confusion at the command level, and incomplete intelligence all played a major role in the military's slow reaction.

The IDF’s failure to understand the extent of the Gaza Division's collapse led to the General Staff's underestimation of the attack's scale. For hours, the army operated with incomplete information, miscalculating which areas required immediate attention and which could be left to less priority. As a result, many forces were deployed to areas that were not under immediate threat, while other regions were left poorly defended.

Hamas was highly organized, having planned their attack meticulously. They operated in waves, with the first wave of 1,175 Nukhba terrorists attacking between 6:29 AM and 7:00 AM, coinciding with a rocket barrage of 1,406 rockets. The second wave followed between 7:00 AM and 9:00 AM with 600 additional terrorists, and a third wave came later in the day, involving 435 more operatives. These waves were supported by additional groups of 1,325 Hamas fighters and 580 members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller terror faction, as well as unaffiliated militants from Gaza.

Air and Naval Operations and Their Limitations

The investigation also highlighted several shortcomings in Israel's air and naval defense capabilities. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had its planes and drones on standby, as per protocol, but the sheer scale of the attack overwhelmed the system. The IAF's readiness was not enough to effectively address the threat. At 7:15 AM, the first drone strike was carried out near Netiv Haasara, which successfully stopped an infiltration attempt by Hamas terrorists. However, the lack of clear situational awareness from the ground made it difficult for the IAF to differentiate between civilians and terrorists.

Due to the fog of war and confusion on the ground, there were several instances where Israeli airstrikes missed their targets, hitting civilian areas instead of the terrorists. In one such case, a drone strike was carried out next to a group of terrorists attempting to reach a building where surveillance personnel were holed up, saving their lives. Nonetheless, the IAF’s ability to intervene was severely limited by the lack of intelligence.

Similarly, the Israeli Navy had a significant challenge dealing with Hamas's infiltration from the sea. On the morning of October 7, 38 Hamas terrorists launched an assault using seven speedboats. Two of the boats were destroyed by the Israeli Navy, but five boats continued their mission, and 16 terrorists successfully infiltrated the Zikim beach area. Tragically, these terrorists went on to murder 17 Israeli civilians.

Despite the efforts of the Israeli Navy, including attacks on the invading boats, the most extreme scenario the Navy had prepared for involved only one or two small boats or a small group of divers. The surprise and scale of the maritime assault caught the Navy off guard, illustrating the lack of preparation for a multi-pronged attack of this nature.

IDF’s Response and the Impact on Civilians

The investigation also focused on the challenges faced by the IDF in responding to the invasion. The deployment of forces in response to the attack took several hours to become fully coordinated. By 7:00 AM, the IDF declared that Israel was officially at war, and it began the process of sending additional troops from northern Israel to the Gaza border. However, due to the simultaneous threats posed by Hamas and the potential threat from Hezbollah in the north, many of these forces were diverted or delayed.

While the IDF mobilized additional troops to the Gaza border, the response was slow, and the terrorists managed to wreak havoc in southern Israel. The attack occurred across 34 different locations, but only 11 of them were manned by IDF personnel by 7:00 AM. As the hours went on, this number increased, but it was clear that the initial response was too slow. The IDF’s efforts to restore order were also complicated by the fact that many of the attacking terrorists were not concentrated in one area, but instead scattered across southern Israel.

The absence of a clear and unified command structure in the early stages made it difficult for the military to respond effectively. Many troops, operating without adequate intelligence or communication, faced extreme difficulties. In some cases, soldiers were forced to withdraw and were unable to engage terrorists due to limited resources or strategic confusion.

Lessons Learned from the Investigation

In the aftermath of the attack, the IDF conducted 41 separate tactical investigations to understand the failures and challenges during the October 7 invasion. These investigations led to a series of crucial findings that are expected to shape future military strategies and preparedness.

The primary lessons from the investigation were as follows:

Resignations and Consequences

The results of the investigation also led to personnel changes within the IDF. Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, the commander of the Gaza Division during the attack, resigned in June following the investigation’s findings. Similarly, Major General Yaron Finkelman, the head of Southern Command, announced his resignation after the failure of the division’s response was revealed.

The IDF’s performance on October 7 remains a source of significant internal debate, with ongoing discussions about how to better prepare for such surprise attacks in the future. While lessons have been learned and protocols are being revised, the tragic outcomes of that day continue to haunt Israel.