In a fascinating artcile, Channel 11's Nurit Yochanan explains how Israel went so far wrong and what they should do now.
Here's what she says:
October 7th is constantly compared to the Yom Kippur War. In fact, it's hard to not compare the two because, in what could be an eerie coincedecnce, they occurred on exactly the same date, 50 years apart, and in both events, Israel's intelligence systems were taken by complete surprise and failed to protect Israel, leading to devastating consequences, which we are still reeling from.
But 20 years after the Yom Kippur War, Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari wrote that the First Intifada that broke out in 1987 constituted, in their opinion, an even greater intelligence failure, despite the fact that the number of Israeli casualties in the Intifada was smaller. Israel, they explained, failed to notice long-term processes, of which there were signs over many years, and actually occurred in its own territory, not in an enemy country, while IDF soldiers were stationed in the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza and in Jenin.
The impressive operations in the last two weeks - from the explosion of pagers and communication devices to the elimination of Nasrallah along with other senior officials, which required knowing the exact location of Hezbollah's Secretary-General even during the war - hint to the fact that October 7th shares something in common with the First Intifada, and in both, Israel failed to stand up to the Palestinians as it did in other arenas.
While Gaza and Lebanon present distinct challenges, the intelligence gap is noteworthy. The Mossad primarily handles Lebanon, while the Shin Bet is responsible for Gaza. Lebanon's heterogeneous society provides more opportunities for intelligence gathering, whereas Gaza's homogeneous population and Hamas's 17-year rule have made penetration extremely difficult.
In recent years,, and in the security establishment's approach of managing periodic conflicts rather than seeking long-term solutions.
So what went wrong in Gaza? Israel underestimated Hamas, which was reflected in public statements by politicians, such as Miri Regev's dismissive "So what if they fired on Ashkelon?" comment in 2019.
It goes even deeper than that though - No one in Israel wanted to go to war in Gaza (including Bibi!) They just wanted their Hamas problem to go away on its own. So what they did is that they made "arrangements" with Hamas, which included Qatari money suitcases in exchange for quiet for periods of time that became increasingly shorter.
And while they though they had the issue under control- the reality couldn't have been farther from the truth. October 7th was the result of pacifying Hamas and hoping that money would calm their hate for Israel. Which- as we know- failed dismally, and Israel continues to pay for these mistakes in blood and tears.
So what should Israel do now?
More than anything else, Israel now needs a comprehensive strategy: The lessons learned from Gaza must inform the approach to the northern conflict with Hezbollah.
Without a clear vision for the future, Israel risks achieving military successes without securing lasting peace or security. The challenge now is to translate tactical victories into strategic gains, a task that requires not just military prowess, but political wisdom and foresight.
