Nine and a half months after the October massacre, the major questions still hover over the IDF's intelligence apparatus, with the primary query being how its leaders failed to notice the early signs of Hamas' intentions.
According to Nir Dvori's report on Channel 12, Hamas' attack planning began 7 or 8 years ago, but the Intelligence Division missed the early indicators. The reason for the intelligence lapse, as reported, is the Military Intelligence Directorates assessment that Hamas was deterred from direct conflict with Israel and focused on improving the economic conditions of Gaza residents under the leadership of Yahya Sinwar, aiming to consolidate its dominance in the region.
In fact, intelligence investigators were entrenched in the belief that Hamas "did not want and could not" engage in war against Israel.
Furthermore, the internal investigation revealed that the interpretation that Hamas abstained from participating in the two confrontations preceding October 7 because it was planning a war was completely neglected by intelligence investigators.
The Head of Military Intelligence Directorate, Aharon Haliva, accepted the conclusions that emerged from the investigation. However, even now, the Intelligence Division does not know for certain how to prevent such cases in the future, and there are ongoing discussions these days to understand the profound implications that need to be drawn so that such an event does not recur in the future.
IDF Spokesperson: "Once the investigations are concluded, they will be presented transparently to the public."
