On the eve of Simchat Torah in 2023, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) found itself in a state of routine readiness, unaware of the impending crisis that would soon engulf the nation.
Just days earlier, veterans of the 113th Squadron had gathered to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, reminiscing about their rapid response to that surprise attack half a century ago. The irony of history's imminent repetition was lost on those present, including Lt. Col. E., the current commander of the 113th Squadron.
As he returned to his base, planning for a quiet holiday weekend, the IAF's helicopter array maintained its standard deployment: four helicopters on standby, with priority given to the northern border. This allocation, based on years of assessing the north as the "hotter" frontier, would soon be put to the test in a way no one anticipated.
The events that unfolded in the following hours would challenge the IAF's readiness and response capabilities, echoing the surprises of 1973 and raising questions about the lessons learned—and forgotten—in the intervening years.
As dawn broke on October 7th, 2023, Israel's Air Force found itself thrust into an unprecedented crisis. What began as a routine Shabbat morning quickly escalated into a desperate scramble to defend the nation's southern border.
At 6:30 AM, as rocket sirens blared across the country, two Apache attack helicopter squadrons - the 113th and 190th - were jolted into action. Initially operating with just four helicopters on standby, the squadrons' commanders, Lt. Col. E. and Lt. Col. A., rapidly mobilized their forces as the scale of the Hamas assault became apparent, as reported by Ynet.
By 8:30 AM, the first Apache helicopters were engaging targets along the Gaza border. Pilots, accustomed to dealing with border demonstrations, found themselves facing a far more severe threat.
Lt. Col. A. recounts the moment reality set in: "I saw something that looked like a Friday demonstration that had gotten out of control. But then I realized this is a war."
As the morning progressed, the air force's response intensified.
By 9:00 AM, six Apache helicopters were in the air, their pilots grappling with unprecedented decisions. They fired on terrorist infiltrators, protected IDF bases, and attempted to stem the tide of the invasion. However, the sheer scale of the attack overwhelmed initial defenses.
The air force faced significant challenges. Pilots struggled to distinguish between civilians and combatants in the chaos. Communication with ground forces was often limited or non-existent. Despite their efforts, many communities had already been overrun by the time air support arrived.
Throughout the day, the number of airborne helicopters grew to eleven. They conducted 48 sorties, firing missiles and providing crucial air support to ground forces. Lt. Col. E. described the situation: "Every five or six minutes, we were receiving call-outs to another incident. You can't construct a picture as to where the more urgent thing is, so you go where they tell you."
The scale of the attack also caught the IAF off guard. Lt. Col. A. admitted, "Since the 2014 Gaza War, we've been training for infiltration incidents in our territory, but we never imagined a reference scenario of this magnitude of a number of communities being infiltrated simultaneously."
Throughout the day, IAF pilots conducted 48 sorties, engaging terrorist targets. However, by 7:30 AM, many border communities had already been breached.
Lt. Col. A. described the relentless nature of the assault: "No matter how many we killed, how much we fired, they just kept coming, traveling through the bodies. It was insane."
He soberly acknowledges, "With the end results, the public is right [to question]. What does it matter what I say? The whole of the IAF was there... but it didn't change the end result."
Critics point to several factors, including insufficient air assets and a failure to anticipate such a large-scale incursion. Lt. Col. A. suggested fundamental changes are needed: "The order of battle needs to change. We have no choice. If we want to be able to deal with 3000 terrorists who get up one morning and decide to infiltrate because we have no warning, then you need to change the order of battle."
Proposed changes include increasing the number of attack helicopters and pilots, and reassessing resource allocation. As Lt. Col. A. noted, "The pie needs to be divided up differently... Maybe we need to use different kinds of vehicles to create the same defense with fewer soldiers. But it always means taking resources away from other places. You can't have it all."
The skies over southern Israel may have been filled with the sound of helicopter rotors on October 7th, but the echoes of that day's failures - and the lessons learned - will resonate for years to come.
