This is the real reason Israel hasn't defeated Hamas 

Brigadier General (Res.) Erez Weiner spent 12 years overseeing war planning against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, preparing the IDF’s Southern Command battle strategies. However, the military leadership and General Staff "pursued a policy that treated Gaza as secondary" and avoided seeking a decisive victory.

In an interview with Kalman Liebskind and Asaf Lieberman on Kan Reshet Bet, Weiner opened up about the war’s management, the hostages, the classified documents he "lost" that led to his dismissal, and the materials he passed to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, reported by Kan News.

Brig. Gen. Weiner explained that he drafted a plan to defeat Hamas as early as January 2014, but "the understanding was that Gaza was a secondary theater. The mindset was ‘you break it, you buy it’—meaning, if you take responsibility away from Hamas, whoever comes next is likely worse, so let’s leave Hamas in place."

He added, "You probably remember the phrases: weakened, deterred, Gaza is a secondary theater. It mustn’t be allowed to monopolize Israel’s attention and resources, so we needed to keep it on the sidelines as much as possible."

According to Weiner, former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi erred by refusing to impose temporary military governance over Gaza. He also argued that the "noise" surrounding the hostage issue and negotiations delayed their release, asserting that military pressure was what ultimately freed hostages.

"I understood that the state prioritized between theaters, I understood the logic, but we still should have acted differently," Weiner said in the interview, noting he participated in hundreds of discussions at various levels. "It was clear that this was the decision: Gaza is secondary, and we need to keep it sidelined as much as possible."

Could the War Have Been Handled Differently?

"Unequivocally. The big mistake, which prolonged the war, was the failure to establish military governance, in other words, not controlling civilian aid. We were forced to allow excessive amounts of aid into Gaza at the demand of our American friends and others, enabling Hamas to maintain control through that aid. The right hand struck Hamas, while the left hand fed and sustained it."

Weiner elaborated, "The plan, which I was at least involved in until I left my role, called for a fundamental change in civilian aid. One more or one less brigade is important, but the most critical factor is full IDF control over what reaches the other side. That would strip Hamas of its power, civilians would lose their fear, and local elements with different interests would emerge. If we combine this with our friend Trump’s voluntary migration plan, which I believe is realistically feasible, along with actions against Hamas outside Israel’s borders, it could defeat Hamas in less than three months."

When asked what "defeat" means to him, Weiner replied unequivocally: "No Hamas rule in Gaza, neither military nor civilian."

The Controversies Surrounding Him

Brig. Gen. Weiner noted, "Three months ago, I lost classified documents without causing any damage. The incident was investigated and concluded at the time. What reignited the story wasn’t the incident itself, but the Ynet article. The document was in my possession and under my authority. I think the Chief of Staff made a wrong move here, both in terms of timing, right before the operation and in the inappropriate way it was handled."

Weiner was also suspected of being Smotrich's mole and providing him with information from the IDF before it got to the cabinet and even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This information includes printed presentations straight from the IDF which even senior ministers were unaware of. This was exposed by Suleiman Maswadeh on Kan News.

Weiner explained, "I was in contact with all cabinet members and other figures. I see myself as a sort of knowledge hub, and as such, I had conversations and meetings with cabinet members, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and other entities."

Weiner emphasized, "Unlike many of my friends and colleagues, I didn’t talk to journalists or rush to leak to the media. I only spoke with individuals who had the appropriate security clearance and responsibility. I also spoke with cabinet members from the previous government."