The IDF had a plan to counter Hamas infiltration. A year before October 7th, they axed it.

For years, Israel’s Southern Command prepared for a large-scale infiltration by hundreds of Hamas’s elite Nukhba fighters into Israeli territory. Yet, a year before the devastating October 7, 2023, massacre, the IDF downgraded this scenario to secondary status, a decision that shaped its response—or lack thereof—on the eve of the attack. New details, aired Wednesday on Channel 12 News, shed light on this shift and its consequences.

According to the report, the primary scenario until 2022 envisioned “a surprise raid by hundreds of terrorists deep into Israel, penetrating communities and military outposts.” But in the year prior to the assault, following the completion of the Gaza border barrier and the perceived success of Operation "Guardian of the Walls" in 2021, the IDF reassessed its priorities. The new focus became a more limited threat: an attack on soldiers near the barrier, potentially involving an abduction. As a result, on the night of October 7, troops were instructed not to approach the fence—leaving the border vulnerable to the mass breach that followed.

The recalibration rested on two key assumptions. First, the newly constructed barrier—designed to thwart both surface and tunnel incursions—was seen as a near-impenetrable deterrent. Second, Hamas’s failed infiltration attempts during "Guardian of the Walls" bolstered confidence that the group lacked the capacity for a large-scale raid. Military officials concluded that a breach by hundreds, let alone thousands, of fighters was improbable.

This stance persisted even after Major General Eliezer Toledano, then-commander of the Southern Command, received intelligence detailing Hamas’s “Jericho Wall” raid plan months later. The document outlined a coordinated assault eerily similar to what unfolded on October 7, yet the primary scenario remained unchanged. Critics point to this as a missed opportunity, while others note the complexity of translating intelligence into actionable policy.

The fallout was stark. When Hamas breached the barrier with tractors and thousands of fighters, the IDF’s preparedness reflected its narrower focus—leaving settlements and outposts exposed. The Channel 12 report raises fresh questions about decision-making at the top echelons of the military and how threat assessments are adapted in real time.

In a statement, Toledano’s office defended his tenure: “The reference scenario remained consistent, with enhancements including an expanded raid simulation of up to eight infiltration points. This was tested repeatedly in divisional exercises.” The response underscores a broader debate: whether the IDF’s adjustments were a reasonable recalibration based on available data or a misjudgment of Hamas’s evolving capabilities.

With ongoing investigations into the military’s readiness, the report adds fuel to a national reckoning over how one of the country’s most sophisticated defense systems failed to anticipate a threat it had once deemed plausible.

Channel 12 contributed to this article.