Former IDF Commander reveals: "I recommended an opening blow before Hamas massacre"

Colonel Haim Cohen, the former commander of the Gaza Division's Northern Brigade, delivered a scathing critique of the senior Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) leadership regarding their response to the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre. In his parting address, Cohen revealed key details about the events leading up to the surprise attack, expressing deep frustration over what he saw as a failure of intelligence and leadership at the highest levels.

Cohen recounted that roughly a month and a half prior to the attack, he had recommended launching a preemptive strike against Hamas. He described a series of violent riots and explosions near the Gaza border that raised concerns, prompting him to advise the senior command to take action. However, he claimed that his warnings were dismissed with the assurance that Hamas was "deterred," and that there was no immediate threat. Cohen's frustration was palpable as he criticized the General Staff for ignoring critical information, saying, "Forever I will ask where the Air Force was on October 7th, and why IDF Intelligence didn’t alert us about the surprise war."

When the attack occurred on October 7, Cohen was on his way to the brigade at 3:30 a.m., despite unclear intelligence reports. He said he naively believed that the IDF leadership would be as prepared as he was. However, by 6:29 a.m., he was witnessing the full scale of the assault—paragliders, rubber rafts, and hundreds of terrorists infiltrating multiple breaches in the security perimeter. At that moment, Cohen realized that Israel was facing a "surprise war."

He criticized the lack of coordination and response from the General Staff during the initial hours of the attack. As missiles rained down, Cohen rushed to the command center only to find it overwhelmed. He was shocked by the lack of communication and action from the leadership, which, according to him, failed to properly engage with real-time intelligence or the media. While the public was receiving detailed reports from civilians, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit was not providing updates, and no clear strategy was in place to counter the rapidly unfolding assault.

Cohen's revelations point to significant failures in preparedness and communication within the IDF, leaving many to question why intelligence about Hamas’s "Walls of Jericho" attack plan, which had been known months prior, did not prompt stronger preventive measures. His criticism underscores a broader sentiment of accountability and the need for urgent reforms in military leadership and intelligence handling.