"There was no defense plan": How the Erez Post massacre unfolded minute by minute on October 7

A security official who spoke tonight (Sunday) with 'Kikar HaShabbat' reports that the operational investigation regarding the battle at the 'Erez' Crossing and the 'Erez' Coordination and Liaison Administration has been completed, and its findings were presented to the bereaved families and families of the hostages.

In addition, the investigation was presented to the camp's servicewomen and servicemen and to the forces that operated there on the day of the incident. The investigation was summarized by the former Southern Command commander, Major General Yaron Finkelman.

The investigation team determined that the IDF failed to fulfill its mission to defend the camp. The IDF forces' pursuit of engagement and fighting in the first hour contributed to saving many lives and prevented damage on a larger scale. Additionally, Air Force strikes neutralized dozens of additional terrorists from infiltrating.

In the attack on the DCL (District Coordination Liaison) area, nine soldiers fell and three were kidnapped alive, of whom one soldier is still held in Gaza.

The investigation findings show that in the first stage, about 20 Nukhba terrorists infiltrated the camp, carrying out acts of killing, kidnapping, looting, and other cruel crimes. At a later stage, about 100 additional terrorists infiltrated, some of whom were Islamic Jihad terrorists and some without organizational affiliation, who carried out acts of looting. The investigation also found that the combat force allocated to the defense mission was insufficient, even against a more limited scenario.

The investigation, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Gidi Kfir-Alo and additional investigation team members, lasted about a year and included interviews and conversations with those serving in the camp, forces that stayed and fought in the area, and meetings with the bereaved families of the fallen.

As part of the investigation, information items, messages, and materials were collected in order to create as clear and accurate a picture as possible of the sequence of events as they occurred.

As part of this, recordings of radio communications, supplementary intelligence collection, use of investigation materials of terrorists who were captured at the beginning of the war were collected. In addition, video from security cameras, interrogations, and field reconstructions were used.

The 'Erez' Crossing area is divided into several areas: the vehicular crossing area, the pedestrian crossing area (the terminal), the camp area (Erez DCL), and the 'Balloon' complex.

On the eve of the surprise attack, the crossing area was under the territorial responsibility of Battalion Combat Team 77 from Brigade 7. The battalion's reserve company (except for one platoon stationed at another post) was stationed at the Erez DCL. The 'Erez' Crossing area was manned by a force of five "Border Crossing Authority" security guards, as is customary on weekends.

At 05:30, the battalion performed "dawn readiness", according to orders and in accordance with the situation assessment known at that time.

At 06:29, the Hamas terrorist organization launched a comprehensive fire attack from the Gaza Strip, which was specifically directed at IDF camps and bases in the sector. The fire attack was aimed at pinning down and concentrating IDF forces in protected areas, to make it difficult for them to go out to defend the settlements and to neutralize defensive measures. The terrorists breached the obstacle in several infiltration routes, from which they infiltrated by vehicles, motorcycles, and on foot.

06:29 - 06:59: First terrorist infiltration into the crossing area and camp

According to these sources, already at 06:32, the observation array in the sector reported identifying terrorist movement on pickup trucks towards the Erez crossing area. All soldiers present in the camp area entered protected areas.

Between 06:32 - 06:42, terrorists breached the border fence and infiltrated Israeli territory from several locations and moved towards Erez camp, Erez crossing, and Kibbutz Erez. At the same time, the sector observer reported over the battalion's radio about infiltrations at several locations in the sector.

At 06:42, the terrorists infiltrated the 'Erez' crossing, spread out in the vehicle crossing area and the "Terminal" (pedestrian crossing), and went up to the roof while sniper fire was directed into the camp. The deputy commander of the reserve company tried to reach the Terminal area and join the "Border Crossing Authority" security guards, but was unsuccessful due to the terrorists' fire from the roof. As a result, he turned back and drove to Moshav Netiv HaAsara, as he understood from listening to the battalion radio network that terrorists had also infiltrated there.

At 06:50, the platoon commander briefed his soldiers on preparations for a terrorist attack on the camp based on two forces: a platoon commander force and a sergeant force.

At 06:52, the five "Border Crossing Authority" employees who were in the Terminal (pedestrian crossing) noticed through the command center cameras the approach of dozens of terrorists, went up to the second floor of the Terminal and locked themselves in one of the rooms.

At 06:54, a terrorist cell arrived at the southeastern corner of the camp and placed an explosive device on the wall with the aim of bringing it down. The explosion did not breach the camp wall. At this time, the operations sergeant called for everyone to enter protected and locked areas. The operations sergeant noticed the terrorists advancing to the 'Balloon' complex and called to update the Balloon force commander, who in response evacuated the complex with the team and headed towards the command center.

After a few minutes, terrorists infiltrated the camp through the southern gate while the platoon commander force's fighters secured the entrance route through which the terrorists entered and began exchanging fire. The sergeant's force continued to fight the terrorists, while the platoon commander force locked the eastern part of the camp to prevent additional infiltration through the main gate. At the same time, one of the fighters in the platoon commander force spotted a terrorist on the Terminal roof and eliminated him.

06:59 - 07:20: Enemy infiltration and fighting in the DCL

At 07:00, three of the Balloon fighters ran towards shelters in the parking area. After finding them locked (they had been converted into offices), they continued and hid in the concrete barriers 'sleeve'. About a minute later, the Balloon commander joined them.

At the same time, the terrorists breached the main gate. The duty officer from the DCL unit fired at them and delayed their entry into the camp. At 07:04, the duty officer returned to the command center after running out of ammunition and locked the doors. At this stage, the terrorists infiltrated the camp through the main gate and split into several focal points in the camp.

Immediately afterward, one of the terrorists threw a grenade towards the entrance to the dining hall. In response to the explosion, the Balloon fighters left the protective sleeve they were in and ran towards the command center, while the terrorist fired at them. As a result of the fire, one of the fighters fell on his way to the command center and the second fighter later died from his wounds in the command center.

At the same time, several terrorists advanced towards the DCL residential complex, killed three soldiers, and kidnapped three others alive.

07:20 - 09:30: Continued fighting in the DCL

At 07:22, an Air Force aircraft attacked in the area. At those minutes, the platoon commander force conducted fierce fighting against several terrorists around the shelters in the parking lot. One fighter fell and another was wounded in this battle. Following the hit on the force, the platoon commander requested reinforcement from the sergeant. A few minutes later, the sergeant joined him with three additional fighters.

Shortly after the forces joined, terrorists opened fire at the sergeant's force and killed the sergeant. The platoon commander charged towards the terrorists and eliminated two of them. The fighting continued, and at 07:34, several anti-tank missiles were fired at the platoon commander force. One of the fighters was killed by the fire.

In order to gather additional strength and reorganize for continued fighting, the platoon commander force headed towards the company barracks to add fighters from the kitchenette. When the platoon commander identified a terrorist in the area, he changed the direction of the force's movement towards the female officers' quarters, in order to prepare for continued fighting in a more secure manner. The platoon commander force had two operational fighters, the platoon commander and another fighter were wounded.

At 07:38, the force entered the female officers' quarters, secured itself, and conducted fighting from the quarters. One fighter fell in this fighting. The force, under the command of the cell commander, fired at terrorists moving towards them in the "kitchenette" area and eliminated two of them.

Starting at 08:22, aircraft began attacking enemy vehicles in the fence area. Some were hit and others turned back to the Gaza Strip. These attacks stopped another wave of terrorists.

At 08:30, the battles in the camp ended.

Between 09:00-09:30, the company commander instructed the cell commander's force to enter a protected area in the kitchenette, as Air Force forces were about to conduct extensive fire in the area.

09:30 - 15:00: Continued battles in the DCL and additional terrorist infiltration

At 09:30, the platoon commander arrived at the kitchenette area (which was under the command of the cell commander), and did not see the force that was supposed to secure the area (following the company commander's instruction to go inside), and therefore concluded that there was no one left to rescue in the camp.

At 10:30, terrorists from the Islamic Jihad organization and additional terrorists without organizational affiliation infiltrated the camp and began a series of looting and burning acts. At this stage, the platoon commander hid with another fighter, while hearing terrorists and assessing that there were no soldiers left to rescue. In reality, contrary to the platoon commander's understanding, there were still soldiers in the base. At 13:30, the platoon commander left together with a fighter who was with him through the greenhouses of Moshav Netiv HaAsara and linked up with the security coordinator of the moshav.

15:00 - 23:00: Searches and clearing the area

Between 15:00-15:30, a force from the Yahalom unit arrived at the camp area. The force had begun moving towards the DCL already at 14:00, with the understanding that its fighters would encounter dozens of terrorists there. Upon arrival, the force was divided into two sectors, with each force searching and clearing its sector, and locating soldiers in their hiding places. The force did not encounter live terrorists during the searches.

At 15:45, a force from the Paratroopers Reconnaissance Unit moved to the Terminal area (pedestrian crossing) and rescued the five "Border Crossing Authority" employees who were inside the communications room. The force did not encounter live terrorists during the searches. At around 19:00, the Yahalom force gathered and removed all DCL soldiers and female soldiers to the Yad Mordechai junction, and then evacuated all the dead and wounded to the junction in the unit's vehicles. At 23:00, responsibility for the camp returned to the sector force.

Main Conclusions of the Investigation

In the forces' actions in the camp, there was a notable gap in the ability to transition from a defensive state to reinforcing the array, stopping the enemy's attack, and destroying it. The investigation revealed that it would have been possible to stop the enemy and bring the fighting to an end with different results, had there been a different deployment of forces.

Implementation of the defense plan – The combat force defined for the defense mission in the "Camp Defense File" – is insufficient to defend the camp even in a lighter infiltration scenario than what actually occurred.

The battalion reserve platoon was in the camp at the time of the attack (and was not stationed to defend a settlement in its sector). Thus, the order of forces in the camp was larger than what was defined for the defense mission in the "Camp Defense File". The presence of the battalion reserve platoon in the camp prevented more severe results. Despite this, the forces did not fulfill the camp defense mission.

The main gate area was overwhelmed by enemy fire at an early stage of the attack, and as a result, quick infiltration without resistance to the center of the camp was made possible. In addition, the forces in the camp had about half an hour (between 06:35-06:59) from the moment the terrorists were identified on the Terminal roof until their infiltration into the camp; this time was not utilized for organizing the forces or briefing all the forces in the camp.

Lack of command and control – The event highlighted the absence of unified command and control for coordination and synchronization between the forces in the area. The DCL commanders partially connected with soldiers by phone and not physically, and "green in the eyes" (visual confirmation) was not performed for all soldiers. As a result, many of the DCL soldiers acted on their own. In addition, the absence of a unified command center for the company and the DCL impaired the management and synchronization of the fighting and the ability to direct the platoon commander force to the enemy in the camp.

The investigation team positively noted Battalion Commander 77's decision at the beginning of the attack to send his available forces to fight in the nearby settlements and defend the residents rather than defending the DCL.

Area organization - Erez DCL was organized as a multi-unit camp and not as a post despite its proximity to the border fence and therefore was not prepared for defense, fighting capability, and stay in the camp. The location of a multi-unit camp in this area and the placement of a large administrative unit in such a location constituted an inherent operational vulnerability in the ability to defend the force and absorb attacks in the area.

Fire support – No artillery force was positioned in the sector area that could have provided a response and assisted the forces during the attack. The air strikes were effective, continuously hit the attack against the forces, prevented additional terrorists from infiltrating into the State of Israel, and drove the terrorists in the attack area back to the Gaza Strip.

Operational readiness – High-trajectory fire as a sign of a possible enemy attack was not internalized among the forces. Furthermore, the presence of a soldier without a weapon in the Erez DCL area constituted a breach of basic operational discipline expected from a soldier and his commanders.